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INTRODUCTION

A divorced mother had obtained a temporary protective order against her
ex-husband because of his physical abuse and harassment.' But he was not
required, as a condition of the protective order, to surrender any firearms.2 Nor
had the court-which was unconvinced that there was danger to the childrenordered his visitation of their three children to be supervised.3 Fearing for their
safety, but having to comply with the court's order for visitation, the mother
exercised caution by meeting her ex-husband in a public park to deliver the
children for visitation with him. 4 The father shot and killed his ex-wife and all
three children with a .22 caliber rifle, then shot himself' Clearly the judge had
underestimated the degree of risk to the family. Providing judges with a tool to
help them better evaluate dangerous situations, whether in family law
proceedings or in the criminal arena, would be a great public service.
By conservative estimates, every year in the United States between 1.3
and 4.8 million women are physically and/or sexually assaulted by their
intimate partners.6 More American women seek medical care resulting from

1. Tyeesha Dixon & James Drew, When Abusers Become Deadly; Shootings Highlight
Concerns About Violent Ex-Spouses, THE BALT. SUN, Nov. 25, 2007, at lB (reporting
father's fatal shooting of ex-wife and their three children then shooting himself, during
unsupervised visitation exchange, despite mother's having obtained a temporary protective
order).
2. Id. The applicable Maryland law did not provide for surrender of firearms as part of
a temporary protective order. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-505 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp.
2008), amended by H.B. 302 & S.B. 268, 2009 Leg., 424th Sess. (Md. 2009). In 2009 the
Maryland law was amended to authorize a judge entering a temporary protective order to
force a respondent to surrender any firearms in his or her possession to law enforcement
authorities.
3. See Dixon & Drew, supra note I (the spouses met in a park "to exchange the
children").
4. Id.

5. id.
6. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN at iv (2000) available at

http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/183781.pdf [hereinafter TJADEN & THOENNES, FULL
REPORT]; NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, UNDERSTANDING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, FACT SHEET (2006), available
at www.cdc.gov/ncipc/dvp/ipvfactsheet.pdf.
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intimate partner violence (IPV)7 than for injuries caused by auto accidents,
rapes, and muggings combined.8 IPV is the leading cause of death among
African American women between ages 15 and 45.9 Women are killed far more
often by their intimate partners than by any other type of killer.' 0 Statistically,

7. Intimate partner violence (IPV), historically referred to as domestic violence, is
defined as the physical, sexual, or psychological harm by a current or former partner or
spouse. NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, Supra note 6. There are four categories of intimate partner violence: physical,
sexual, threats, and psychological/emotional. LINDA E. SALTZMAN, JANET L. FANSLOW,
PAMELA M. MCMAHON & GENE A. SHELLEY, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE SURVEILLANCE
11 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipvsurveillance/Intimate Partner
Violence.pdf.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") defines physical violence, such as
punching, slapping, or choking, as the intentional use of physical force with the potential for
causing physical harm, injury, disability or death. Id. at 11-12. The CDC divides sexual
violence into three categories: abusive sexual contact; the use of force to compel a person
unwillingly into a sexual act; and the attempted or completed sexual act with a person who is
unable to understand the condition of the act or decline participation or express
unwillingness to engage in the act because of intimidation, disability, illness, or intoxication
by drugs or alcohol. Id. at 12.
The CDC defines threats as including the use of words, gestures, or weapons to express
intent to injure, physically harm, disable, or kill. Id. It describes psychological or emotional
violence, most often preceded by physical and sexual violence, as the use of coercive tactics
such as humiliation; control of both the victim's movements and access to money or other
resources; withholding of information; and isolating the victim from her friends and family.
Id. at 12-13.
IPV exacts huge monetary and nonmonetary costs on individuals, families, and society. The
CDC estimated the monetary costs to be near $4.1 billion annually in 2003. NAT'L CTR. FOR
INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, COSTS OF
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (2003), available

at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv cost/LPVBook-Final-Febl8.pdf. The actual costs
may be considerably higher. The 2008 "White Paper" estimates that IPV costs over $306
million in Ohio alone.
IMPROVING

FAMILY

KENNETH STEINMAN

VIOLENCE

PREVENTION

& TIMOTHY R. SAHR, WHITE PAPER ON
IN OHIO 12 tbl.2 (2008), available at

http://healthpolicyohio.org/pdf/OFVP WhitePaper.pdf.
8. Erin L. Han, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in
Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORD L.J. 159, 160 (2003). See also Michael T.
Morley, Richard Albert, Jennie L. Kneedler & Chrystiane Pereira, Developments in Law and
Policy: Emerging Issues in FamilyLaw, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 169, 208-09 (2003).

9. Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Daniel Webster, Jane Koziol-McLain, Carolyn Block, Doris
Campbell, Mary Ann Curry, Faye Gary, Nancy Glass, Judith McFarlane, Carolyn Sachs,
Phyllis Sharps, Yvonne Ulrich, Susan A. Wilt, Jennifer Manganello, Xiao Xu, Janet
Schollenberger, Victoria Frye & Kathryn Laughon, Risk Factorsfor Femicide in Abusive
Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089,
1089 (2003) [hereinafter Campbell, et al., Femicide]. For American women overall, IPV was
the seventh leading cause of premature death. Id.
10. Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Daniel Webster, Jane Koziol-McLain, Carolyn Rebecca
Block, Doris Campbell, Mary Ann Curry, Faye Gary, Judith McFarlane, Carolyn Sachs,
Phyllis Sharps, Yvonne Ulrich & Susan A. Wilt, Assessing Risk Factorsfor Intimate Partner
Homicide, 250 NAT'L INST. JUST J. 14, 18 (2003) [hereinafter Campbell, et al., Assessing
Risk Factors]. Intimate partner killings account for 40 to 50 percent of deaths in families in
the United States. Id.
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then, women have more to fear from their jealous or controlling husbands,
obsessed or jilted lovers, or vindictive ex-husbands, than from random
strangers." Approximately 76 percent of 1PV homicides and 85 percent of IPV
attempted homicides have been preceded by stalking and harassment. 12

Some victims of IPV are able to extricate themselves from abusive
relationships. Many others stay, believing that they - or their children - will be

at greater risk of being murdered by their abusers if they leave.' 3 Unfortunately,
a significant number of both of these groups of victims are eventually killed, or
suffer nearly fatal injuries, at the hands of their current or ex-partners. 14 Both
physically leaving and legal separation are associated with increased risk of
intimate partner homicide.' 5 Tragically, some of the victims who stay see

murdering their abuser as the only way out of the relationship, and act
accordingly.16 A New York State study reports that in 70-80 percent of intimate

Between 1976 and 1996, the percentage of female versus male victims increased from 54
percent to 72 percent of IPV killings. Campbell, et al., Femicide, supra note 9. The
percentage of intimate partner homicides involving male victims decreased correspondingly
during this period. Id. "Each year, IPV results in an estimated 1,200 deaths and 2 million
injuries among women and nearly 600,000 injuries among men." Ctr. for Disease Control,
Adverse Health Conditions and Health Risk Behaviors Associated with Intimate Partner
Violence - United States, 2005, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Feb. 8, 2008, at
113.
11. Angela Browne, Violence Against Women by Male Partners: Prevalence,
Outcomes, and Policy Implications,,48 Am. Psychologist 1077, 1077 (1993). See also Myrna
S. Raeder, The Better Way: The Role of Batterers'Profilesand Expert "Social Framework"
Background in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 147, 181 (1997)
("Statistics agree that between one-third to two-thirds of all murdered women are killed by
their batterers.") [hereinafter Raeder, The Better Way]; Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility
of PriorActs of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1467-69
(1996) (reporting statistics on IPV and spousal murder) [hereinafter Raeder, PriorActs].
12. Judith M. McFarlane, Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Susan Wilt, Carolyn J. Sachs,
Yvonne Ulrich & Xiao Xu, Stalking and Intimate PartnerFemicide, 3 HOMICIDE STUD. 300,
311 (1999).
13. See Han, supra note 8, at 164-65 (listing reasons why women stay in abusive
relationships).
14. Campbell, et al., Femicide, supra note 9, at 1091. See also supra note 10.
15. Margo Wilson, Holly Johnson & Martin Daly, Lethal and Nonlethal Violence
Against Wives, 37 CANADIAN J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 331, 340-41 (1995); Myrna Dawson &

Rosemary Gartner, Differences in the Characteristicsof Intimate Femicides, 2 HOMICIDE
STUD. 378, 395 (1998); Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide Risk and
Estrangement,8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMs 3, 3 (1993).
16. Cf MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (LexisNexis 2006) (providing
admissibility of evidence of expert testimony as to battered spouse syndrome and evidence
of "repeated physical and psychological abuse" of the IPV victim/now defendant by the
homicide or first degree assault IPV abuser/now victim). See generally Denise Bricker, Note,
FatalDefense: An Analysis of Battered Women 's Syndrome Expert Testimony For Gay Men
and Lesbians Who Kill Abusive Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1379 (1993); DONALD
ALEXANDER DowNs, MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME SOCIETY,

AND THE LAW (1996) (criticizing use of such evidence); Irvin B. Nodland, Defending
Battered Women: Everything She Says May Be Used Against Them, 68 N.D. L. REV. 131
(1992); Raeder, The Better Way, supra note 11, at 178-79 (discussing pertinent social
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partner homicides, no matter which partner was eventually killed, the man was
found to have physically abused the woman before the murder.' 7
In an effort to help female 18 IPV victims better assess their degree of risk
of being killed by their partner, Dr. Jacquelyn Campbell of the Johns Hopkins
School of Nursing developed a questionnaire referred to as the Danger
Assessment (the DA).' 9 This tool has evolved through several iterations since
its first version was employed in 1985.20 It asks the victim to "use a calendar to
indicate the approximate dates during the past year when the victim was abused
by her perpetrator," and to answer "yes or no" questions relating to frequency
or severity of violence; weapons use; drug and alcohol use; threats to murder
the victim or children; control and possessiveness; threats by the abuser to
commit suicide; whether the victim has children from another relationship;
unemployment; and other issues related to the abusive relationship. 2' Several

science research and proposing that it would be more helpful and less unfairly prejudicial to
present background evidence regarding batterers' profiles than evidence that the victim
suffered from battered woman syndrome); Myma S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword:
Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome by and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating
Domestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 790 (1996) (companion article, introducing the
argument that the focus should not be on battered woman syndrome but to provide
background information "about the dynamics of domestic violence" and "the nature of
battering relationships") [hereinafter Raeder, Double-EdgedSword].
17. Campbell, et al., Assessing Risk Factors,supra note 10, at 18. See also Campbell,
et al., Femicide, supra note 9, at 1089 (the majority of intimate partner homicides, both male
and female, involve some form or history of male battery of the female partner).
18. A much higher percentage of victims killed by IPV are female rather than male.
Campbell, et al., Femicide, supra note 9, at 1089.
19. The DA is one of the best known IPV risk assessment tools. Lisa A. Goodman,
Mary Ann Dutton & Lauren Bennett, Predicting Repeat Abuse Among Arrested Batterers:
DangerAssessment Scale in the CriminalJustice System, 15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
63, 65 (2000).
20. See Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Daniel W. Webster & Nancy Glass, The Danger
Assessment: Validation of Lethality Risk Assessment Instrument for Intimate Partner

Femicide,24 J. INTERPERSONAL

VIOLENCE

653, 657, 661-62 (2009) [hereinafter Campbell, et

al., The Danger Assessment]; Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Nursing Assessment for Risk of

Homicide with Battered Women, 8 ADVANCES INNURSING Sci. 36, 38-41 (1986) (discussing
the use of the original version of the DA) [hereinafter Campbell, NursingAssessment].
21. Dana Harrington Conner, To Protect or to Serve: Confidentiality, Client
Protection, and Domestic Violence, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 877, 918-19 (2006); Nat Stern &
Karen Oehme, Increasing Safety for Battered Women and Their Children: Creating a
Privilegefor Supervised Visitation Intake Records, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 499, 510 (2007);
available at
(2003),
DANGERASSESSMENT.ORG
CAMPBELL,
C.
JACQUELYN
[hereinafter
http://www.dangerassessment.org/WebApplicationl/pages/da/DAEnglish.pdf
CAMPBELL, DANGERASSESSMENT.ORG].

Increased IPV homicide risk is associated with the presence of stepchildren in the home,
unemployment, prior violence, drug or alcohol abuse, gun use, forced sex, and abuse during
pregnancy. Campbell, et al., Femicide, supra note 9, at 1091-92; Angela Browne, Kirk R.
Williams & Donald G. Dutton, Homicide Between Intimate Partners:A 20-Year Review, in
HOMICIDE:

A

SOURCEBOOK OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

A. Zahn eds., 1999).

149, 160 (M. Dwayne Smith & Margaret
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decades of social science research have vetted the accuracy of 22its evaluation of
the constellation of factors reported in a particular relationship.
Various versions of the DA are currently used in numerous settings: by
first responders (police, ambulance attendants, and paramedics); 23 by social
workers, domestic violence shelter volunteers, and other counselors of IPV
victims;24 and by criminal law enforcement investigators and prosecutors in
assessing whether and how to proceed with pressing charges.25 Several
questions arise: if the DA is helpful in gauging the degree of risk in a particular
relationship, should it also be admissible in court proceedings? 26 Do the current
rules of evidence permit its introduction in family law proceedings? 27 In
criminal proceedings? 28 Some states have enacted statutes that require the use
of risk assessment tools like the DA in, for example, bail review and sentencing
proceedings. 29 Are such statutes necessary for admissibility of the DA?3"
This article will provide background on the evolution of the DA, the
research underlying it, and its extrajudicial and judicial uses to date. It then will
explore the DA's potential for use in various court proceedings, with regard to
applicable requirements for admissibility into evidence regarding (1) relevance,
(2) character evidence, (3) hearsay, (4) expert testimony and scientific
evidence, and (5) the risk of unfair prejudice. Because the DA results are
sometimes counterintuitive, the authors of this article argue that informing
courts of the process involved in the DA analysis would be helpful to the
factfinder. 3 1 The article will conclude that under the current rules pertaining to

22. See infra Part V.B.3.a.
23. See infra Part III.

24. JANICE ROEHL, CHRIS O'SULLIVAN, DANIEL WEBSTER & JACQUELYN CAMPBELL,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT VALIDATION STUDY, FINAL REPORT 4
(2005), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/209731.pdf [hereinafter ROEHL, ET AL.,
VALIDATION STUDY]; E-mail from Dorothy J. Lennig, Esq., Domestic Violence Legal Clinic,
House of Ruth, to Lynn McLain, (July 29, 2008, 16:19 EST) (on file with author) ("[W]hen
a victim calls the House of Ruth or some [other] domestic violence programs, staff/attorneys
use the lethality assessment/danger assessment to advise their clients about safety
planning.").
25. See Jan Roehl & Kristin Guertin, Intimate Partner Violence: The Current Use of

Risk Assessments in Sentencing Offenders, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 171, 186-88 (2000) (discussing
use of risk assessment instruments used by justice system officials to provide better
protection for victims, more appropriate sanctions and treatment for offenders, and better
allocation of scarce resources, from prosecutor time to prison beds) [hereinafter Roehl &
Guertin, IPV].
26. See Campbell, NursingAssessment, supra note 20; infra Parts IV.B, V.
27. See infra Part IV.B.
28. For example, either the propensity rule; the hearsay rule; Federal Rules of
Evidence 403 or its state corollary; or the confrontation clause will likely exclude such
evidence when offered in a criminal trial on the merits against a defendant charged with a
subsequent assault or murder of the abused victim. See infra Parts IV.B.-C., V.
29. See infra Part IV.C.
30. Id.

31. See ROBIN HASSLER, BYRON JOHNSON, MICHAEL TowN & NEIL WEBSDALE,
MINNESOTA CTR. AGAINST VIOLENCE & ABUSE, LETHALITY ASSESSMENTS AS INTEGRAL
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evidence, a properly administered DA should be admissible in many - but not
all -judicial settings.32 Even where the DA results ought not be admitted,
expert testimony regarding the probative value of various factors relevant to the
degree of risk may be proper.33 We suggest that the adoption of statutes
providing explicitly for the consideration of risk assessments may hasten the
process toward more frequent judicial consideration of them.34
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE

DA

Since the late 1970's, as researchers clamored to create instruments that
could accurately predict the threat of physical violence, over thirty-three IPV
screening tools have been created. 35 The DA is one of the best known of these
IPV risk assessment tools, 3 6 and is one of a handful currently in use by agencies
and service providers throughout the country.37 The DA was originally
developed in 1985 for use in a health care environment, to enable practitioners
to evaluate IPV risk and consult with at-risk patients.38 It has been revised
several times as a result of input from battered women, law enforcement
agencies, and victims' advocates. 39 The DA instrument was empirically
validated in 2003..
The DA calculates risk of lethal or nearly lethal violence based on the
cumulative presence of various risk factors associated with the killing of female
victims of IPV. 41 Among others, these factors include stalking, 41 prior physical

(1998-2005),
GUARANTEES
FAITH
AND CREDIT
OF PROVIDING FULL
PARTS
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/ffc/chapter9/chapter9.html ("[W]e have had judges
tell us they would love to have objective assessments of the potential for lethal violence in a
given relationship. Such information would be extremely useful in the judicial handling of
domestic cases..."; "With [appropriate training], the judge can then place restrictions upon
the abuser in accordance with the judge's informed assessment of risk of lethal violence.")
32. This article addresses whether the DA could be properly considered in various
court proceedings; tactical concerns as to whether such use would be advisable for one's
clientele are beyond the scope of this article. See infra Part V. While judges and criminal
prosecution participants in the Round-Table, see supra note tt, generally believed the DA
would be useful in the civil court, IPV victims' advocates expressed concerns that its use
could be a double-edged sword, with unintended adverse consequences.
33. See infra Part V.B.3.a.
34. See infra Part V.D.
35. Eve Waltermaurer, Measuring Intimate Partner Violence (IPV):You May Only Get
What You Ask For,20 J. Interpersonal Violence 501, 504 (2005).
36. Goodman, et al., supra note 19, at 65.
37. ROEHL, ET AL., VALIDATION STUDY, supra note 24, at 1,4.
38. The original instrument was fifteen questions long and asked victims about the
presence or absence of certain risk factors. Campbell, Nursing Assessment, supra note 20, at
37, 40.
39. Campbell, et al., The Danger Assessment, supra note 20, at 657, 661-62;
ASSESSING DANGEROUSNESS: VIOLENCE BY SEXUAL OFFENDERS, BATTERERS AND CHILD
ABUSERS (Jacquelyn C. Campbell, ed., Sage Publications 1995) [hereinafter ASSESSING
DANGEROUSNESS].
40. See infra Part V.B.3.a.
41. Campbell, et al., The DangerAssessment, supra note 20, at 653.
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assault, history of estrangement, substance abuse, forced sex, battery while
pregnant, the presence of a step-child in the home, the victim's leaving for
another partner, the perpetrator's access to a handgun, and unemployment of
the batterer4 3

Certain risk factors are more heavily weighted in the DA because they
have been found to be more significantly correlated with near-lethal or lethal
outcomes. 44 For example, a woman who was assaulted or threatened with a
handgun is twenty times more likely to be the victim of homicide than when a
handgun was not used; the mere presence of a gun in the home increases the
homicide risk by a factor of eight.45
The DA is administered in two sections. 6 In the first part, the victim
identifies, on a calendar, days on which abusive incidents occurred. 47 The
calendar section facilitates recall of events while they are relatively fresh. 48 The
second part of the DA is an interview.4 9 The victim is asked a series of twenty
"yes" or "no" questions regarding the presence or absence of risk factors.5 °
Each risk factor is assigned a particular point value, based on actuarial

42. See Raeder, PriorActs, supra note 11, at 1468 ("ninety percent of women killed by
their husbands or boyfriends were stalked"). One definition of a stalker is "'[a]ny person
who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who
makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her
safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family." CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1995).
43. Campbell, et al., The Danger Assessment, supra note 20, at 656. See also
Goodman, et al., supra note 19, at 65.
44. Campbell, et al., The DangerAssessment, supra note 20, at 662. Of course, this is
simply an actuarial assessment of risk. Absence of the correlates "does not necessarily
indicate that violence will not become lethal." MINN. ADVOCATES FOR HUM. RTS., ASSESSING
LETHAL
AND
EXTREMELY
DANGEROUS
BEHAVIOR
3
(2003),
http://www.stopvaw.org/sites/3f6dl 5f4-cl 2d-4515-854426b7a3a5a41e/uploads/@LethalityModule.PDF. Nor does their presence necessarily mean
that the relationship will become fatal. NEIL WEBSDALE, NAT'L ONLINE RES. CTR. ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, LETHALITY ASSESSMENT TOOLS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 4
(2000), http://new/vawnet.org/Assoc_FilesVAWnet/ARlethality.pdf.
"While
such
instruments appear to be helpful to courts as supplemental information sources in making
decisions about sentencing and the allocation of resources, and there is anecdotal evidence of
their value in enhancing victim safety, solid information on the reliability and validity, and
particularly on the accuracy of prediction, of risk assessment instruments is lacking." Roehl
& Guertin, 1PV, supra note 25, at 191.
45. Campbell, et al., Femicide, supra note 9, at 1092. See also Campbell, et al.,
Assessing Risk Factors, supra note 10, at 16 ("When a gun was in the house, an abused
woman was six times more likely than other abused women to be killed.").
46. CAMPBELL, DANGERASSESSMENT.ORG, supranote 21.
47. Id.
48. See John Hopkins Univ. Sch. of Nursing, Psychometric Data: Danger Assessment
(2005),
http://www.dangerassessment.org/WebApplication I/pages/psychometric.aspx
[hereinafter
Psychometric
Data];
Danger
Assessment
Calendars,
http://www.dangerassessment.org/WebApplication 1/pages/da/calendar2009.pdf.
49. CAMPBELL, DANGERASSESSMENT.ORG, supra note 21.
50. Id.

STOP THE KILLING

2009]

weighted "yes" responses, the
research."' The greater the number of highly
52
outcome.
fatal
a
of
risk
victim's
the
greater
Based on their scores, victims fall within four different danger categories:
from lowest to highest, these are "Variable Danger," "Elevated Danger," "High
Danger," and "Highest Danger."53 Under the DA protocol, a woman assessed
as being in "Variable Danger" is informed by the interviewer of that fact, but is
also informed that one's risk can change quickly and to watch for certain
warning signs.54 Women at "Elevated Danger" are advised to seek safety
assistance from social services support groups, law enforcement, and the
judiciary.55 Women at either the "High" or "Highest" level of danger require
assertive safety measures from criminal justice professionals, such as denial of
bail for the batterer, heightened parole supervision, and only supervised child
visitation.56
III.

EXTRAJUDICIAL USES OF THE

DA

The DA has been used throughout the country in various extrajudicial
contexts to assess the degree of risk to individual victims. Health professionals
use the DA to counsel their patient-victims.57 Indeed, the DA is readily
accessible on the internet, so that any victim can consult and self-administer it,
at no charge.58
Police and other first responders in some jurisdictions have been trained,
upon responding to a domestic violence call, to inquire from a shortened
eleven-question DA. 59 Based on the answers they receive, they determine how
dire the situation is. 60 If they receive certain "yes" answers, they are directed to
call a hotline, with the victim's permission, and offer the victim the opportunity
to talk to a counselor by telephone. 6'

51. See John Hopkins Univ. Sch. of Nursing, Danger Assessment (2005),
http://www.dangerassessment.org/webapplicationl/pages/product.aspx; Psychometric Data,
supra note 48.
52. Psychometric Data,supra note 48.
53. Jacquelyn Campbell & Anna D. Wolf, Intimate Partner Violence Risk Assessment:
41-42,
slide
Safety,
Women's
for
Implications
http://www.son.jhmi.edu/research/Homicide/Lethality Assessment.pps.
54. Id. at slide 43.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Campbell, Nursing Assessment, supra note 20, at 40-41.
58. CAMPBELL, DANGERASSESSMENT.Org, supra note 21. It should be noted that the
DA forms contain specific instructions to "[p]lease talk to your nurse, advocate, or counselor
about what the Danger Assessment means in terms of your situation." Id.
59. Karen L. Bune, Lethality Screen for Domestic Violence Situations,
LAWOFFICER.COM,

Apr.

2,

2008,

http://www.lawofficer.com/news-and-

articles/columns/Bune/LethalityScreen for DomesticViolence.html.

60. Id.
61. Id.
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One of these programs, the Domestic Violence Lethality Assessment
Program for First Responders ("LAP") instituted in a region in Maryland, was
reported in 2007 to have yielded
strong indications that lives are, indeed, being spared and that victims
at the highest risk of being killed are seeking services they would not
have otherwise accessed. The voluntary expansion of the LAP from a
mere four law enforcement agencies and two domestic violence
programs in 2005 to currently 57 agencies and 18 programs is further
demonstration
of the widespread belief that the LAP is a worthwhile
62
tool.
A study of the LAP, conducted by Dr. Pamela C. Ovwighi, showed that,
between July 1, 2006 and 2007:
[O]f 1295 screens that were administered, 57.9% of victims screened
in at "high danger." Of those, 45.2% spoke to a counselor at the time
of screening and 15.4% availed themselves of program services in
the weeks after the screening. Moreover, 95.4% of the "high danger"
victims that MSCFV [a domestic violence counseling service] served
as a result of the LAP screening had never sought services from the
program before. This outcome corroborates Jacqueline Campbell's
research that indicates only 4 percent of domestic violence murder
victims nationwide had ever availed themselves of domestic violence
program services. The results of this study strongly suggest that the
LAP is an effective method for linking domestic violence victims
who are in high danger with programs that can help them.
Between January 2006 and June 2007, 3,334 lethality screens
were administered in Maryland, which is an average of six per day.
Of those, 1,805 victims (54%) were assessed by officers as having
the greatest risk of being killed by their abusers. Of this group, 890
victims (49%) agreed to speak on the phone with a hotline counselor
on the scene after the officer placed the call. Of those 890 victims
statewide, 284 (32%) have sought domestic violence program
services. 63
Once contacted by a victim, numerous lay social service or nonprofit
organization counselors, as well as civil attorneys at domestic violence shelters,
clinics, and attorneys in private practice, use the DA to advise their clients

62. MARYLAND NETWORK AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE LETHALITY ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM FOR FIRST RESPONDERS 2-3 (on file with author).

63. Id. (citing PAMELA C. OVWIGHO, LETHALITY SCREENING FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
VICTIMS: WHO Is BEING REACHED? (2007) (on file with authors)).
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regarding safety planning. 64 Some prosecutors have used it to assess what
65
degree of protection to seek, including, for example, whether to oppose bail.
IV.

EXISTING AND POSSIBLE USES OF THE

DA

IN COURT PROCEEDINGS

The "bottom line" of the DA - ranging from "Variable Danger" to
"Extreme Danger" - is but one of its components. Both the assessed risk
category and other components might be useful in a myriad of court
proceedings. Admissibility will turn on what is being offered into evidence, in
what type of proceeding, and for what purpose. Thus far, some judicial uses are
reported to have been made; indeed, in some jurisdictions use of the tool has
been sanctioned or required by statute.66 One might first ask, why do the
authors believe there is a compelling need that a reliable DA can satisfy?
A.

Apparent Need for the Information

Reports of serious under-recognition of risk factors and resulting tragedies
are all too easy to find.67 In one 2007 Maryland case, for example, a mother
reported to the family court judge that her husband had been committed to a
mental hospital for threatening to commit suicide and, after his release, had
threatened to kill his children. 68 The judge, relying on court-appointed
therapists who saw "no signs of acute danger," denied the mother's requests for
a protective order. 69 A second judge denied her request to stop her husband's
child visitations.70 In March 2008, during an unsupervised visitation with their
three children, ages 6, 4, and 2, the father drowned the children in a hotel
bathtub and then tried to overdose on pills and slit his own throat. 7 Because the
science underlying the DA proves the high significance of suicide threats, a
judge informed by the DA would have been more likely in this case to take
steps to protect the children.72

64. See ROEHL, ET. AL., VALIDATION STUDY, supra note 24, at 1, 4-5.

65.
66.
67.
68.
Aug. 23,

See Roehl & Guertin, JPV,supra note 25, at 186.
See infra Part IV.C.
See supra notes 1, 3-5 and accompanying text.
Melissa Harris, Father Seeks to Plead Guilty to Killing Children, THE BALT. SUN,
2008, at IA; Freeman Klopott, Courts Failed Her and Her Kids, Mother of Slain

Children Says, THE EXAMINER, Apr. 4, 2008, at 4.

69. Klopott, supra note 68, at 4.
70. Kelsey Volkmann, Judicial System Failed Slain Children, Friends Say, THE
EXAMINER, Apr. 2, 2008, at 4.

71. Harris, supra note 68, at A1; Klopott, supra note 68, at 4 (the father reportedly
admitted that he had drowned the children).
72. See HASSLER, ET. AL., supra note 31 (reporting that judges have said they "would
love to have objective assessments of the potential for lethal violence").
There are, of course, other issues: for example, judges may discredit the testimony of a
spouse who reports facts "favorable" to "her side" of the case. Although there has been an
overall reduction in IPV nationally, criminal justice interventions are reported not to have
significantly contributed to the decline. William Wells & William DeLeon-Granados, The
Decline of Intimate PartnerHomicide, 252 NAT'L INST. JUST. 33, 34 (2005). In many cases
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Types of Proceedingsin Which the DA May Be Relevant; Applicability or
Inapplicabilityof Rules of Evidence

Components of the DA may be relevant in many types of proceedings. On
the civil side, IPV could be relevant to the granting of temporary or permanent
protective orders,73 as well as to legal separations, divorce, child custody,
visitation, and adoption.74 The same information may be relevant in juvenile
proceedings regarding shelter care, child-in-need-of-assistance, termination of
parental rights, or delinquency. 75 The relevance would be the same whether the
matter arises before a judge or a court-assigned mediator.
In the criminal arena, ultimately, either the abuser or the victim may be
charged with a crime, such as assault or murder. If the alleged abuser is
charged, the DA may be relevant (and likely admissible) to prove future risk in
a bail review hearing,76 a sentencing proceeding,77 to prove past conduct in a

police refuse to arrest, prosecutors fail to charge, and judges fail to impose adequate
penalties. See generally Raeder, Prior Acts, supra note 11, at 1477-87 (demonstrating the
need to change attitudes toward domestic violence); Raeder, The Better Way, supra note 11,
at 159-60 (discussing need to "debunk" "myths that surround battered women and their
batterers"); Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-OrderCoverage:
A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 93 (2005) (arguing that courts provide less
protection to unmarried partners).
Only approximately 17 percent of women who are the victims of IPV seek and obtain
protective orders. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 52 (2000). Perhaps many do not seek
judicial remedies because they have no faith in the system to either believe them or protect
them. Id. at 51; see also WEBSDALE, supra note 44, at 5 (citing battered African-American
women who were reluctant to report abusers or disclose personal information to advocates,
police, or other criminal justice personnel, both because the system has historically
oppressed the African-American community and because they may be seen as "snitches"
within it; asserting that Asian-American women also are particularly reluctant to discuss
victimization).
73. In Maryland state courts, for example, there are two types of civil protective
orders. There is a first stage, temporary, ex parte protective order, for the granting of which
only "reasonable grounds" are needed. MD. RULE 3-731 (LexisNexis 2009) (district court
commissioner); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-1501 to 3-1504 (LexisNexis
2006); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4-501 to 4-511 (LexisNexis 2006). There is also a
second stage, "final" protective order (which lasts for no more than six months' duration).
Here the burden of persuasion is by clear and convincing evidence. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 3-1505; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506. Remedies can include orders for
the alleged abuser to "get out of the house," "stay away," make "no contact," and obtain
counseling (or, possibly, mediation). Surrender of guns may be ordered as part of a final
protective order. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-511.
74. See A.B.A. Steering Committee on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children, Judicial
Checklist, 39 FAM. L.Q. 5, 5 (2005) (listing factors for judges to consider).
75. See, e.g., Terry S. v. Dep't. of Health & Soc. Servs., 168 P.3d 489 (Alaska 2007)
(child in need of assistance); Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. M.L., 984 So. 2d 606
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (shelter case); In re B.W., 651 S.E.2d 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)
(shelter case); In re M.B., 595 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999); In re Jenna KK., 855
N.Y.S.2d 700 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (termination of parental rights).
76. See generally WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA (1976); MARY A.
TOBORG, PRETRIAL RELEASE: A NATIONAL EVALUATION OF PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES
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revocation of probation or parole hearing, or (though not likely admissible) in a
trial on the merits.
The same is true if the abused victim is charged. Here the defendant/abuse
victim may be offering the evidence either to show traditional self-defense or
perhaps to show "battered spouse syndrome," thus justifying a preemptive
strike against the batterer, such as killing him while he was sleeping. 78 The
restrictive rules of evidence governing the admissibility of the DA evidence for
such purposes are strictly applied only in civil or criminal trials "on the merits":
trials resulting in civil judgments for79 the plaintiff or the defendant, or in
criminal verdicts of guilty or not guilty.
The evidence rules do not apply to most of the other proceedings
mentioned above.8 0 The resultant flexibility allows the judge presiding over

(1981). In Maryland, for example, a district court commissioner reviews the statement of
probable cause and sets an initial bail. The next day, a district court judge conducts bail
review and considers the possibility of pretrial release under Maryland Rule 4-216. If the
case is removed to circuit court, often the defense requests another bail review there.
77. See Roehl & Guertin, IPV, supra note 25, at 191 ("While such instruments appear
to be helpful to courts as supplemental information sources in making decisions about
sentencing and the allocation of resources, and there is anecdotal evidence of their value in
enhancing victim safety, solid information on the reliability and validity, and particularly on
the accuracy of prediction, of risk assessment instruments is lacking. A number of legal and
ethical issues have been raised and remain unresolved. Yet a small but significant number of
courts and court-connected agencies are using risk assessment instruments and procedures,
and several studies are under way to test their purported value."). See also Raeder, The
Better Way, supra note 11, at 159 ("When faced with a charming defendant without any
prior criminal record, profile information can influence a judge's decision concerning the
defendant's release before trial and/or whether to impose a sentence that will give him a
'wake-up call,' instead of a mere slap on the wrist.").
78. See Campbell, et. al., Femicide, supra note 9, at 1089.
79. See FED. R. EvID. 101(b) & (d) (delineating proceedings in which rules of
evidence apply and do not apply); LYNN McLAN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND
FEDERAL §§ 101:1 to 101:2 (2001) (discussing applicability of evidence rules in Maryland
and in federal courts).
80. In the criminal arena, the evidence rules do not strictly apply in grand jury
proceedings; in proceedings for the initial setting of bail and bail review (pretrial release);
release after conviction and before sentencing; or sentencing in non-capital cases. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000) ("No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence."); MD. RULE 5-101(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) (grand jury); MD. RULE 5-101(b)(6)
(pretrial and pre-sentencing release); MD. RULE 5-101(b)(9) (non-capital sentencing);
Querubin v. Commonwealth, 795 N.E.2d 534, 544 (Mass. 2003) (rules of evidence do not
apply at bail proceedings); Snow v. Commonwealth, 537 N.E.2d 578, 579 (Mass. 1989)
("Hearsay statements may be used by a judge in reaching a decision concerning the amount
of bail."); State v. Porter, 310 N.W.2d 926, 927 (Neb. 1981) ("the latitude allowed a
sentencing judge ... is almost without limitation as long as it is relevant to the issue"); State
v. Engel, 493 A.2d 1217, 1225 (N.J. 1985) (extrajudicial confession of codefendant, though
inadmissible at trial, admissible at bail hearing in limited circumstances).
Strictly following the evidence rules is also not required in proceedings for revocation of
probation. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 609 (1985) (listing procedural requirements
for probation revocation); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 436 n.7 (1984) (admissibility
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those proceedings to hear evidence that would be inadmissible under the rules.
The only limit is that ifthe judge's ultimate decision is based on unreliable
evidence, the losing party's constitutional due process right will have been
violated. 8' Importantly, evidence (including hearsay evidence) need not be
admissible under the evidence rules in order to be considered reliable.82 To
attack a judge's decision successfully on this constitutional basis, the losing
party would have to show not only that (1)the judge let in unreliable evidence,
but also that (2) the judge's decision either (a) explicitly or (b) necessarily
rested on that evidence, i.e., there was not enough other evidence to support the
judge's decision.83 This is a very difficult burden to meet.

of evidence at a revocation hearing is more informal than at trial); Ash v. Reilly, 431 F.3d

826, 829-30 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting application of confrontation rights to parole
revocation hearings); United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 2005) (parole
revocation); MD. RULE 5-101(c)(2) (court has discretion whether to strictly apply the
evidence rules in proceedings for revocation of probation).
Crime Victims' Rights, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771 et seq. (2009), inspired the widespread adoption
of state statutes or constitutional provisions that authorize or require consideration of victim
impact statements during the sentencing stage. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. 1,§ 32, cl. 1
(victim's right "to be heard" at sentencing); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.1

commentary (2008) (stating that the presentence investigation is essential in determining the
facts relevant to sentencing); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.520(2) (LexisNexis 2005) (impact
statement may contain victim's recommendation for an appropriate sentence); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 217.762 (2004) (presentence investigation shall include a victim impact statement).
On the civil side, the evidence rules do not strictly apply in hearings on ex parte temporary
protective orders or on "final protective orders. See, e.g., MD. RULE 5-101(b)(12) (codified
rules do not apply in proceedings which were not bound by common-law rules of evidence).
Nor do they apply in proceedings on juvenile detention and shelter care under MD. RULE 5101(b)(1 1), and the court has discretion to apply them or not in juvenile disposition hearings
under MD. RULE 5-101(c)(6).
81. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, joined by Scalia, J.) ("Reliability is more properly a due
process concern. There is no reason to strain the text of the Confrontation Clause to provide
criminal defendants with a protection that due process already provides them."); United
States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he relevant provision at sentencing
is the due process clause, not the confrontation clause"); United States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d
332, 342-43 (2d Cir. 2004) (due process requirement applies to probation revocation
proceedings, but the confrontation right does not); In re Billy W., 875 A.2d 734, 749-51
(Md. 2005) (although the rules of evidence do not "strictly apply" in certain kinds of
proceedings, including juvenile, disposition, and permanency planning hearings, sentencing
hearings, probation revocation, and administrative hearings, proponent must demonstrate
that "evidence proffered for admission is sufficiently reliable and probative prior to its
admission"); Travers v. Balt. Police Dep't, 693 A.2d 378, 386 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)
(although the rules of evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings, the evidence
adduced "must demonstrate sufficient reliability and probative value to satisfy the
requirements of procedural due process").
82. E.g., In re Billy W., 875 A.2d at 750-51; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Ziegenfuss, 49
A.2d 793, 798 (Md. 1946).
83. See, e.g., Kade v. Charles H. Hickey Sch., 566 A.2d 148, 149, 152 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1989) (reversing agency's decision that was based on unreliable hearsay).
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When there is a jury trial on the merits, however, the trial court's correct
application of the evidence rules is strictly enforced. An incorrect ruling will
result in reversal if the appellate court finds that wrongly admitted evidence
was likely to have affected the jury's decision.84 In criminal appeals in some
states, the state bears the heavy burden of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error in no way influenced the [guilty] verdict."85
By contrast, in bench trials on the merits, the judge is likely to be more
lenient in admitting evidence that may be inadmissible under the evidence
rules.86 This more casual treatment is appropriate because the appellate court
assumes that a judge did not rely on inadmissible evidence even if the judge let
it in. To win a reversal in this situation, the appellant would have to show that
the judge either explicitly or necessarily relied on that evidence. 7 Divorce and
child custody cases are always tried to the bench, 8 while the fact finder in a
criminal case may be either the judge or a jury.89
C.

Admissibility or ConsiderationRequired by Legislative Act

A statute requiring admissibility of particular evidence will trump an
exclusionary rule of evidence, as long as the rule is not constitutionally
mandated. 90 Absent a statutory directive and in a proceeding to which the
evidence rules apply, the rules will govern. 9' Absent a statutory directive and in
a proceeding where the evidence rules do not apply, admissibility will be at the
discretion of the judge, subject to due process constraints. 92
Some United States jurisdictions have directly addressed the admissibility
of the DA or findings based on other risk assessment tools by adopting statutes

84. E.g., Lee v. State, 950 A.2d 125, 134 (Md. 2008); Dorsey v. State, 350 A.2d 665,
678 (Md. 1976) ("[Wlhen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a
reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot
be deemed 'harmless' and a reversal is mandated. Such reviewing court must thus be
satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of-whether
erroneously admitted or excluded - may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty
verdict.").
85. See Dorsey, 350 A.2d at 678.
86. See, e.g., In re Beverly B., 530 A.2d 766, 771 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (trial
court's decision was affirmed, where it had admitted inadmissible hearsay, but its opinion
made clear that it did not rely on hearsay).
87. E.g., Howell v. State, 195 A.2d 592, 593 (Md. 1963) (per curiam).
88. Cynthia Callahan, John F. Fader II, Thomas C. Ries & Richard J. Gilbert I,
MarylandFamily Law (MB) Ch. 2, § 2-2 (4th ed. 2009).
89. 25 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 623.02, 623.04 (3d ed.
2009).
90. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by an Act of Congress, by these
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.").
92. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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requiring their consideration.9 3 In Ohio, "Amy's Law," passed in response to
the attempted murder of a woman by her former husband while he was free on
bail, requires the judge to use a risk assessment tool similar to the DA in
making bail or bond-setting decisions.94 Minnesota requires a risk assessment
of a domestic violence offender before sentencing.95 The resulting evaluation
provides the judge with recommendations for limitations on contact with 96the
victim and other measures that should be taken to ensure the victim's safety.
Colorado's Domestic Violence Risk Reduction Project was tasked with
finding screening and assessment tools to assist the criminal justice system with
identifying risk levels for domestic offenders. 97 Successes with the Domestic
Violence Screening Instrument (DVSI) and Spousal Assault Risk Assessment
(SARA) tools have resulted in mandated risk assessment by the Colorado
Departments of Probation, 98 which use the DVSI. 99 Probation departments in
Connecticut use the Kingston Screening Instrument for Domestic Violence (KSID) to inform their recommendations. 00
New York has created specialized domestic violence courts that
incorporate a social science approach with a view toward both protecting
victims' safety and extending therapeutic resources to offenders.'0 1
Additionally, the New York Domestic Violence Court uses risk assessment to

93. See supra Part IV.
94. Michael Brigner, Amy's Law: New Ohio Domestic Violence Bail Statute Adds
Safety Precautionsfor Crime Victims and the Public, 18 OHIO DOMESTIC RELATIONS J. 17,
17 (2006) (referencing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.251 (West 2006)). Risk assessments

are also routinely used in sentencing in Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Nebraska, and
Vermont, as well as in Canada. Roehl & Guertin, 1PV, supranote 25, at 178, 184.
95. MINN. STAT. § 609.2244 (2009) ("A presentence domestic abuse investigation must

be conducted and a report submitted to the court by the corrections agency responsible for
conducting the investigation.
96. Id.
97. Rebecca Love Kourlis & Amy Barry Houghton, The Impact of Family Violence on
the Colorado Judicial Branch 28 COLO. LAW. 13, 13-14 (1999). Colorado statutes require

probation officers to complete DV risk assessments as presentence evaluations and police
who have received complaints of domestic violence from two or more opposing persons,
must - in determining whether one or more have committed a crime - consider, inter alia,
"the likelihood of further injury to each person," and must follow statutory user-friendly
restraining order forms. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2004).
98. Kourlis & Houghton, supra note 97, at 13.
99. Id.
100. ROEHL, ET AL., VALIDATION STUDY, supra note 24, at 4.
101. Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts:
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1300-02 (2000);
Cheryl Hanna, The Paradoxof Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1505, 1520 n.52 (1998); Editorial, Improving New York's Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1997, § 1, at 22 (describing New York State's plan to create specialized
domestic violence courts); see also N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., N.Y. State
Domestic
Violence
Courts
Program
Fact
Sheet,

http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/ofpa/domviolcrtfactsheet.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2009)
(explaining background information about New York Domestic Violence Courts).
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abusers for treatment options as an alternative to punitive
evaluate substance
02
measures.1
V.

WHEN THE EVIDENCE RULES GOVERN ADMISSIBILITY, WILL THE DA BE
ADMISSIBLE?

When there is no statute authorizing the admissibility of the components
of the DA, the evidence must first pass muster under the evidence rules, if they
apply to the particular type of court proceeding.'0 3 If the evidence rules do not
exclude the evidence, its admission also must not offend a party's constitutional
rights. 0 4 Admissibility will turn on what piece of the DA is being offered, for
what purpose, and on whether it is being offered for or against a criminal
defendant (in the latter case either the defendant's constitutional right to present
witnesses in his favor or his right to confront adverse witnesses may be
implicated'0 5 ).
A.

What Might Be Offered into Evidence?

In addition to the DA, pertinent social science literature, as well as expert
testimony regarding the DA, may be offered into evidence. The DA includes at
least five separable items:
(1) Introductory explanatory text, i.e., what the victim read (or was told)
about the DA;
(2) The questions posed in the DA and the alleged victim's answers;
(3) The resulting numerical "score" in an individual case;
(4) The category of risk of murder or severe injury where this score falls:
"Variable" (1-7), "Increased" (8-13), "Severe" (14-17), or "Extreme" (18
or more); and
(5) A comparison of this person's risk of being killed or severely injured,
compared to that of other adults who have been abused by their intimate
partners.
It is possible, of course, that one or more of these pieces may be admissible and
others not.
Social science literature regarding the reliability of the DA may also be
offered. Expert testimony may be offered regarding the predictive value of
individual factors present in the particular case and/or of the aggregate of such
factors. Experts also might be asked to testify regarding the particular victim's

102. See Tsai, supra note 101, at 1301.
103. See supra Part IV.B-C.
104. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.

105. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the fight ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor...").
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resulting numerical score and/or classification in one of the four categories of
risk of being fatally or near-fatally injured.
Regardless of the type of proceeding, whether any or all of these items
10 6
might be admissible in evidence depends first on whether they are relevant
and, if so, how.
B.

For What Relevant Purpose is the Evidence Offered.- A Hearsay or NonHearsayPurpose?

Admissibility often depends on not only what piece of evidence is offered
but also for what purpose. 10 7 Different analyses will apply, for example, to the
admissibility of (1) the victim's out-of-court answers to the DA questions; (2)
the DA score and/or category of risk; and (3) materials shown and explanations
made to the victim about the DA.
1.

The Victim's Answers to the DA Questions

If the evidence is offered to show what actually happened between the
alleged victim and the alleged abuser and the evidence rules apply to the
proceeding, the victim's out-of-court answers to the DA questions must not
only satisfy the character evidence rules but also will have to satisfy the
hearsay rules. A statement such as, "He broke the bathroom door down after
the birthday party last month and beat me," would be hearsay if offered to
prove the abuser's conduct.
a.

CharacterEvidence Rules

Although the character evidence rules pose formidable obstacles to the
admissibility of the DA evidence, there are no novel issues under the
exclusionary character evidence "propensity rule" when the DA answers are
offered as proof of acts other than the one at issue at trial (e.g., the defendant
assaulted the victim on other occasions, therefore this helps to show that he
battered her this time, which at the time of the court proceeding is in the
past). 0 8 Under the character evidence rules, the DA evidence presents no

106. See FED. R. EVID. 402. "The provisions that all relevant evidence is admissible,
with certain exceptions, and that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible are 'a
presupposition involved in the very conception of a rational system of evidence.' Thayer,
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 264 (1898). They constitute the foundation upon which the
structure of admission and exclusion rests." Id. at Advisory Committee's Note.
Because the vast majority of states have codes of evidence following the organization of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, this article will sometimes merely cite to the Federal Rules.
107. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
108. Federal Rules of Evidence 404 retains the common law's general rule of
exclusion of character evidence if offered to prove that, on a particular occasion, a person
acted in conformity with his or her character. FED. R. EvID. 404(a), (b). The Advisory
Committee Note to Federal Rules of Evidence 404 explains:
Character evidence is susceptible of being used for the purpose of suggesting an
inference that the person acted on the occasion in question consistently with his

STOP THE KILLING

2009]

challenge that distinguishes it from a witness who testifies to having seen the
earlier assaults. The "propensity rule" currently applicable under Federal Rule
of Evidence 404 and its state corollaries generally excludes such "other acts"
evidence,' 0 9 though that evidence may be admissible for a limited purpose such
as proving the defendant's motive11 ° or intent. 11' It is also admissible in a
hearing when seeking a protective order, because then the predictive quality of
past acts as to future acts not yet committed is at issue.112
b.

The HearsayRule

The exclusionary "hearsay rule," however, will exclude proof of the
victim's answers if it is offered to prove that what the victim reported when
answering the DA questions was true, unless a "hearsay exception" applies." 3
Typically the evidence will be offered against the alleged batterer. 14
i.

Possible Hearsay Exceptions

The victim's answers will fall within the hearsay exception for excited
utterances" 5 only if the statements were made while she was under immediate,

character. This use of character is often described as "circumstantial."
Illustrations are: evidence of a violent disposition to prove that the person was
the aggressor in an affray, or evidence of honesty in disproof of a charge of theft.
This circumstantial use of character evidence raises questions of relevancy as
well as questions of allowable methods of proof.
109. Id. at 404(b). Professor Raeder has proposed amending the federal rules to permit
evidence of past acts of domestic violence, similarly to how Federal Rules of Evidence 41315 treat past instances of sexual assault or child molestation. See Raeder, Prior Acts, supra
note 11, at 1505-06 (proposing adding a subsection (4) to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a)).
110. E.g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996); Roshan v.
Fard, 705 F.2d 102, 105 (4th Cir. 1983) (in a civil assault case in which both parties claimed
self-defense, reversible error to preclude defense from showing that defendant had been an
informant whose evidence had resulted in plaintiff's earlier conviction on drug charges, as it
would establish a "strong motive" for plaintiff to attack defendant).
111. E.g., United States v. Peden, 961 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1992) (in prosecution for
sexual abuse of a mentally "slow" 15-year-old, no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence
of defendant's prior conviction for sexual abuse of a minor, as it went to his intent to take
advantage of one incapable of resisting or unable to appreciate the act). See generally
Raeder, Double-Edged Sword, supra note 16, at 789; Raeder, PriorActs, supra note 11, at
1488-1505; Raeder, The Better Way, supra note 1l, at 160-61, 167-71, 185.
112. Coburn v. Coburn, 674 A.2d 951, 958-60 (Md. 1996).
113. FED. R. EVID. 802.
114. For a discussion of the hearsay rule when the victim is charged with a crime, see
infra Part V.B.3.
115. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) ("The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule,
even though the declarant is available as a witness: . . . Excited utterance. A statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition."). See, e.g., United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197,
231-32 (2d. Cir. 2008) (ruling no abuse of discretion to admit mother's statements to a
bartender that she was afraid of her son, soon after police had arrived to arrest her son for
assaulting his mother); United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 186 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming
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continuing distress caused by the assault and they concern only that assault.
These requirements may sometimes be met if a first responder asks only "What
happened?"'"16

But if the first responder begins asking more pointed questions, the
victim's answers may lose the spontaneity required to qualify as excited
utterances." 7 Additionally, under the United States Supreme Court's recent
confrontation clause
cases, Crawford v. Washington"l and Davis v.
9
Washington," once a police officer's primary goal changes from emergency
response to investigation of a past crime, the victim's answers will become

the admission of statements as excited utterances when the victim exited her car, approached
the police officers as they arrived, crying and upset, and exclaimed that the defendant had
threatened her); United States v. Abraham, 386 F.3d 1033, 1037 (11th Cir. 2004) (ruling no
plain error in admitting in a 911 call that defendant was abducting caller's mother and sister
at gun point) (no Crawford issue raised to court); United States v. Jackson, 124 F.3d 607,
618 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming mother's statement to police, at her home, that defendant had
been threatening members of the family and had a gun, which she had secured upstairs, was
properly admitted as an excited utterance).
116. E.g., United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 496 (6th Cir. 2005) (ruling no abuse
of discretion in admitting as excited utterances out-of-court statements made by defendant's
wife to the police upon their arrival); United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 120-24
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (affirming the proper admission of a 911 call 15 to 20 minutes after alleged
threats, and after victim first called her mother, as an excited utterance; fact that part of
statement responded to operator's question did not preclude admissibility); United States v.
Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83, 85-86 (8th Cir. 1980) (ruling no abuse of discretion to admit
nine-year-old assault victim's statements to police officer in response to question "What
happened?," between 45 minutes and 75 minutes after the assault; factors to consider include
whether statement was in response to inquiry, lapse of time, declarant's age and physical and
mental condition, the characteristics of the event, and the subject matter of the statements);
Manno v. State, 623 A.2d 677, 678, 688-90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (affirming court
properly admitted as excited utterances decedent's statements to treating paramedic and
corporal in response to their questions, as to what her name was, what had happened, and when she replied that her boyfriend had shot her - what her boyfriend's name was and where
he lived); Johnson v. State, 492 A.2d 1343, 1348 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (A police
officer testified that when he arrived at the scene, the victim's face and ears were bleeding
and she was yelling that she had been beaten and robbed. The victim's statement to him was
held to be an excited utterance even though it was made after he had gotten her "'calmed
down a little bit,"' and asked her "'point blank' what had happened.").
117. See Winzer v. Hall, 494 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[A] statement made
after the declarant has had an opportunity to reflect or discuss the matter with others does not
carry 'the weight accorded longstanding judicial and legislative experience in assessing the
trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements."') (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497
U.S. 805, 817 (1990)); Mouzone v. State, 452 A.2d 661, 666 (Md. 1982) ("Despite the fact
that [declarant] may still have been somewhat shaken from the incident, it is beyond
credibility to suggest that her coherent and descriptive responses to Danko's questions were
impulsive or spontaneous. Rather, we hold that Byrd's statement was the product of
thoughtful consideration and thus outside the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule."), overruledon other grounds by Nance v. State, 629 A.2d 633, 643 (Md. 1993).
118. 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that the confrontation clause generally bars the
admission of out-of-court statements that qualify as testimony absent the defendant's
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant).
119. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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"testimonial."1 2 0 If the statements are determined to be testimonial, they will
then be inadmissible - even if they fall within a hearsay exception - if offered
against a criminal accused, unless either (1) the victim also testifies at trial and
is subject to cross-examination; or (2) the victim is unavailable to testify at trial
but either (a) the defendant earlier had an opportunity to cross-examine her
regarding the statement or (b) the defendant waives or forfeits his right to
cross-examine. 121

Even if the victim's statements do not qualify as excited utterances,
depending on the particular code of evidence that is applicable, other hearsay
exceptions may apply. In Maryland state courts, for example, if the victim
testifies at trial but contradicts her statements made during the DA, any written
answers she has signed, or any audiotaped or videotaped answers she gave
during the DA, would be admissible as substantive evidence when offered by
either the prosecution or the 22defense under the hearsay exception for certain
prior inconsistent statements.
If the victim is unavailable to testify,123 the "forfeiture by wrongdoing"
hearsay exception might apply. 24 This exception will apply only if the trial
judge finds that the alleged abuser's subsequent 25 wrongdoing intentionally
126
caused the victim's inability to testify (e.g., through murder or intimidation).
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court held in Giles v. Californiathat in this
situation, too, when the defendant's wrongdoing was intended to prevent the

120. Id. at 822 ("Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are
testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."). See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Mass. 2005) (holding victim's statements to her mother
were nontestimonial, but victim's statements to police officer were testimonial; "Statements
made in response to questioning by law enforcement agents are per se testimonial, except
when the questioning is meant to secure a volatile scene or to establish the need for or
provide medical care."). Contra State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 249 (Minn. 2006).
121. Crawford,541 U.S. at 59-60 n.9.
122. MD. RULE 5-802. 1(a) (LexisNexis 2009).
123. The unavailability must be for a reason listed under Federal Rules of Evidence
804(a), except unavailability due to a valid privilege will not qualify for purposes of
forfeiture by wrongdoing. See State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 658 (Wash. 2002) (defendant
did not waive his confrontation right regarding his wife's out-of-court statements when he
exercised his marital privilege to prevent his wife from testifying), rev 'd on other grounds.
124. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(6) ("The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness... Forfeitureby wrongdoing. A statement offered
against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.").
125. See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008) (suggesting that the
wrongdoing must be intended to prevent the speaker's testifying at a court proceeding, such
as a divorce, custody, or criminal trial).
126. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(6); MD. RULE 5-804(b)(5); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 10-901 (LexisNexis 2006). See Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2963 (the intent requirement is
mandated by the confrontation clause of the Federal Constitution).
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victim from testifying and it had that result, the defendant also will have
forfeited the right to127cross-examine, and there will be no confrontation clause

bar to admissibility.

ii.

A Nonhearsay Purpose

Even if the evidence does not fall within a hearsay exception, neither the
hearsay rule' 2' nor the confrontation clause 129 will exclude the evidence if it is
offered for a relevant limited, nonhearsay purpose. Several nonhearsay uses of
the victim's DA answers are plausible.
First, if the victim testifies for the prosecution at a criminal trial, her prior
statements must be provided to the defense. 30 Then, if her trial testimony

127. 128 S. Ct. at 2963; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The
extent to which Giles left open the door for proof of forfeiture as a result of the abuser's
patterns of conduct and their psychological effects on the victim, see, e.g., Raeder, Prior
Acts, supra note 11, at 1480, is a highly important question that is beyond the scope of this
article.
128. FED. R. EVID. 801, 802. See, e.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153,
173 n.18 (1988); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 409 (1985) (when defendant testified
that his confession had been a coerced repetition of accomplice's confession, it was proper to
allow state to introduce, in rebuttal, accomplice's confession for nonhearsay purpose, with
limiting instruction, not to prove truth of accomplice's assertions but to prove what happened
when defendant confessed); United States v. Johnson, 529 F.3d 493, 501 (2d Cir. 2008)
("We agree with the government that such use of hearsay for an unimportant nonhearsay
purpose of setting the stage and explaining background can be appropriate, if the hearsay
statement does not assert matter of significant importance to the question of the defendant's
guilt."); United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the
district court did not error by admitting out-of-court statements for the nonhearsay purpose
of establishing background context for the police response).
129. E.g., Tennessee, 471 U.S. at 414; United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 81 (3d
Cir. 2008) ("Nonhearsay use of evidence as a means of demonstrating a discrepancy does
not implicate the Confrontation Clause."); United States v. Van Sach, 458 F.3d 694, 701 (7th
Cir. 2006) ("When recorded evidence [of a conversation between the accused and an
informant] is admitted in the absence of testimony by an informant who recorded the
conversation, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is not violated if the
statements are non-testimonial and are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. It is
well settled that non-hearsay statements are admissible if they are offered to provide
context." The district court gave a proper limiting instruction to the jury.); United States v.
Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006) ("One thing that is clear from Crawford is
that the Clause has no role unless the challenged out-of-court statement is offered for the
truth of the matter asserted in the statement.").
130. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 (stating that a criminal defendant is entitled to obtain prior
statements of witnesses who have testified for the government). Formerly, production was
compelled by the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982), enacted after the decision in Jencks
v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). E.g., United States v. Lewis, 35 F.3d 148 (4th Cir.
1994); Robinson v. State, 730 A.2d 181, 181 (Md. 1999) (statements made by arresting
officers to Internal Affairs Division of police department were "Jencks/Carr" statements that
must be produced by state, despite any confidentiality provisions in statute, which dealt with
rights of police officers); Carr v. State, 397 A.2d 606, 615 (Md. 1979) (when state's witness
had identified defendant as the one who shot the victim, it was reversible error for court to
refuse to compel production of witness's signed prior inconsistent statement; "To deny to
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differs (i.e., is more harmful to the defendant) from the answers she gave in the
3
DA, the defense may impeach her by her prior inconsistent statements.1 1
Second, if she testifies consistently with her DA answers but is impeached and
her prior consistent answers would help to rehabilitate her, the prosecutor may
have them admitted on the limited issue of her credibility. 3 2 Third, a DA or any
the limited purpose of explaining the basis for a
part of it may be offered for
33
testifying expert's opinion.1
2.

The DA Score and/or Category of Risk

Because the DA calculation assumes the truth of the victim's out-of-court
answers, if the evidence rules exclude the victim's answers, the DA calculation
would be inadmissible hearsay as well when offered to prove the risk of future
lethal or serious injury. But the DA score and/or category of risk may be
admissible for a non-evidentiary purpose or for a limited nonhearsay purpose.
a.

Non-Evidentiary Purpose

In a non-jury trial such as one for child custody, the judge might be asked
to make his or her own risk assessment, using the DA format. If the victim
testifies to some of the DA factors at trial and the judge - as the fact finder believes the victim's testimony, the judge might wish to use the DA format to
reach his or her own assessment of risk to the victim and her children.134 The
judge would not be relying on the victim's out-of-court answers to the DA
questions, but would be relying on the DA's explanatory text and the
supporting social science literature. The information could be brought to the
judge's attention by counsel, or sua sponte as a result of judicial training on risk
assessment.

defense counsel the tool necessary for . . .adequate cross-examination under these
circumstances amounts ... to a denial . . . of due process of law.").
131. FED. R. EvID. 613(b).
132. MD. RULE 5-616(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2009); Holmes v. State, 712 A.2d 554, 560
(Md. 1998). See also Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995) (holding that statements

made after declarant had alleged motive to fabricate are inadmissible as substantive evidence
but declining to opine as to whether they could be admissible as to credibility); Lynn
McLain, Post-Crawford: Time to Liberalize the Substantive Admissibility of a Testifying
Witness's Prior Consistent Statements, 74 UMKC L. REV. 1, 40 (2005) (urging amendment
of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) so that it would permit, subject to Federal Rules
of Evidence 403, substantive use of all prior consistent statements that a jury logically would

find relevant to rebut any allegations offered to impeach the witness, as well as adoption of a
rule specifically permitting substantive use of the witness's prior consistent complaint of
sexual assault); Raeder, PriorActs, supra note 11, at 1468, 1512-17 (proposing the creation
of a hearsay exception for "trustworthy statements of a domestic homicide victim who has
suffered at least three previous instances of domestic violence at the hands of the
defendant").
133. See infra Part V.B.3.a.

134. However, in a criminal jury trial, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Booker requires that the jury alone find facts that are ultimately used by the
judge to increase a convicted defendant's sentence. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
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In this situation, the court might take judicial notice of the pertinent social
literature as "legislative facts"''

35

or "background/social context facts"1 36 to

which the evidence rules do not apply (a "non-evidentiary" purpose). The judge
then could make the numerical and category assessments herself. 37 This
approach might help a judge who, without the benefit of the DA, might
undervalue the degree of danger added by a particular factor, such as the
alleged abuser's unemployment, ownership of a gun, suicidal ideation, or the
alleged victim's having a child that
is not the abuser's. The judge's use of the
38

DA might well prevent tragedies.1
b.

Nonhearsay Purpose

If an expert testifies and relies on the DA, the expert's explanation of the
DA and its method of calculating risk may be admissible for the limited
purpose of explaining the basis of the expert's opinion. 39 Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 and its state corollaries permit the trial judge to rule that even
inadmissible hearsay, if "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field,"' 140 may be disclosed to the jury on direct examination if "their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect."'424' In that event, a limiting
instruction under Rule 105 would be appropriate.
3.

When the IPV Victim is the Defendant

In the situation where a defendant alleges that she acted in perfect selfdefense - or imperfect self defense, as a preemptive strike against her
135. See FED. R. EvID. 201 (rule governing judicial notice of adjudicative facts);
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 195 (1961) ("[T]his Court has many times taken judicial
notice of well-known economic and social facts."); Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc. v. Capital
Terminal Co., 391 F.3d 312, 322 n.12 (1st Cir. 2004) ("'Adjudicative' facts, which are
governed by Fed. R.Evid. [sic] 201, are 'simply the facts of the particular case.' 'Legislative
facts,' by contrast, include facts 'which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking
process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the
enactment of a legislative body.' For example, in Muller v. Oregon, the Supreme Court took
judicial notice of extensive sociological research that supported shorter working hours for
women in evaluating the rationality of statutes mandating such hours. Judicial notice of
legislative facts is not governed by Rule 201.") (citations omitted).
136. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559, 559 (1987) (describing the "rapidly increasing" use of
social science research results "to construct a frame of reference or background context for
deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case," though they neatly fit
neither category of legislative or adjudicative facts).
137. See generally, e.g., Joseph A. Colquitt, Judicial Use of Social Science Evidence at
Trial, 30 ARIz. L. REv. 51 (1988).
138. See supra Part 11.
139. FED. R. EVID. 703. See infra Part V.B.3.a.
140. FED. R. EvID. 703.
141. Id.
142. See FED. R. EvID. 105 (governing limiting instructions).
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batterer143 - the hearsay analysis will change. Her fear of the batterer becomes
relevant. 44 The defendant may choose to offer her out-of-court statements to
show her state of mind. Direct assertions of her state of mind ("I am afraid he
will kill me next time."), offered to prove that state of mind, will be hearsay but
will fall within the hearsay exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) and
its state corollaries. 45 Statements offered as circumstantial evidence of her state
of mind ("He will kill me next time."), offered to prove merely a belief she had
she was factually correct, will be nonhearsay when offered for this
and not that
146
purpose.

143. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
144. See Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444 (8th Cir. 2004) (victim's statements
were admitted properly as evidence of her mental state because defense implied that she had
committed suicide); Cooley v. State, 849 A.2d 1026, 1032 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004)
(witness's out-of-court statement recounting that his cousin told him someone said that
defendants would kill witness if he talked was admissible to prove witness was aware of
threats, which was relevant to explain his inconsistent testimony at trial), rev'd on other
grounds, 867 A.2d 1065 (Md. 2005); Case v. State, 702 A.2d 777, 779-80 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1997) (when murder defendant's defense was that the victim had invited him into her
home and that the gun went off by accident, trial judge properly admitted, as relevant to
whether victim had invited him in and voluntarily positioned herself close enough to him
that she could be accidentally shot, the victim's out-of-court statements of her fear of the
defendant; evidence of a domestic violence protective order that prohibited the defendant
from entering the victim's home was also properly admitted for this purpose); Green v. State,
569 A.2d 741, 747-48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (evidence was erroneously admitted when
non-hearsay purpose was not relevant to a material issue).
145. Federal Rules of Evidence rule 803(3) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:... Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition.
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will.
See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Hernandez, 497 F.3d 71, 81 (1st Cir. 2007) ("To be
admissible under the state-of-mind exception, 'a declaration.. .must mirror a state of mind,
which, in light of all the circumstances, including proximity in time, is reasonably likely to
have been the same condition existing at the material time."' (citation omitted); Horton v.
Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The premise for admitting hearsay statements
evidencing state-of-mind is that such statements are reliable because of their 'spontaneity
and [the] resulting probable sincerity."' (citation omitted)); see generally LYNN McLAIN, 6A
MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE & FEDERAL §§ 803(3):1, 803(3):3 (2001).
146. E.g., United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 312 (2d Cir. 2007) ("This court
has recognized that 'the mere utterance of a statement, without regard to its truth,' may
circumstantially evidence 'the state of mind of the declarant,' and, as such, does not
constitute 'hearsay."' (citation omitted)); Talley v. Bravo Pitino Rest., Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241,
1249-50 (6th Cir. 1995) (declarants' racist comments offered in discrimination case to show
declarants' racial attitudes); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 971 (S.D. Ohio
2005); United States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 421-22 (E.D. Va. 2002) (declarant's
making of plans beyond date of her disappearance); Balt. City Passenger R.R. Co. v. Knee,
34 A. 252, 253 (Md. 1896) (witness whose presence at place was in dispute could properly
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As an unintended consequence of the DA, the defendant may offer the
statements made to her either in the text of the form or orally by her counselor
("You are in extreme danger of being killed.") for the nonhearsay purpose of
showing their effect on her state of mind. 47 Again they would be relevant to
prove that she thought she was in grave danger.
Such evidence could also be relevant in a divorce proceeding, for
example, as to why the victim changed the locks or left the family home. The
victim would offer it to show that her acts were not culpable constructive or
actual "abandonment" of her spouse. The confrontation clause would pose no
cases, or in criminal
bar in these scenarios, as it does not apply either in 4civil
8
cases when the criminal accused offers the evidence.
a.

Expert Testimony

In any type of proceeding, either side of the case could call an expert
witness who testifies that his or her profession reasonably relies upon the DA to
make statistically valid generalized predictions of risk. 149 The expert could be

prove it by evidence that he had related to another person about facts which he could have
learned only there).
147. E.g., United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 529 (4th Cir. 2008) (missing person
poster was relevant to show its effect on reader, defendant); United States v. Song, 436 F.3d
137, 139 (2d Cir. 2006); Moore v. Plaster, 313 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 2002) (evidence relied
on by prison officials in disciplining prisoner properly admitted in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action);
Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 382-83 (3d Cir. 2002) (doctor's statement to
employer was properly admitted for limited purpose of showing why defendant did not allow
plaintiff employee to return to work); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 152021 (11 th Cir. 1996) (error to exclude transcript of telephone conversation on hearsay grounds
when offered to show effect on hearer, i.e., his knowledge of reported problems); Tracinda
Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 362 F. Supp. 2d 487, 495-96 (D. Del. 2005) (news article
admissible to prove that readers were aware of its contents); Greenwald v. State, 157 A.2d
119, 125 (Md. 1960) (statements admitted not for their truth but because acted on by
witnesses); Shunk v. Walker, 589 A.2d 1303, 1309-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (reasons
why mother sought modification of child custody order [Authors' Note: mother's state of
mind, as opposed to merits of her concerns, would ordinarily be irrelevant]).
148. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
149. FED. R. EVID. 703. The rationale for the approach codified by Federal Rules of
Evidence 703's permitting expert testimony that is based on hearsay not admitted in evidence
is set forth as follows in a pre-Federal Rules of Evidence decision of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York:
Opinion testimony by an acceptable expert resting wholly or partly on
information, oral or documentary, recited by him as gathered from others, which
is trustworthy and which is practically unobtainable by other means, is
competent even though the firsthand sources from which the information came
be not produced in court. . .. [I]t has been said that "the requisites of an
exception to the hearsay rule" are "necessity and circumstantial guaranty of
trustworthiness." In other words, when hearsay evidence is offered it is
admissible if resort to it be essential in order to discover the truth and if the
surroundings persuade the court that the information adduced by the expert as a
basis of his opinion is reliable.
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asked to testify to his or her opinion regarding the degree of risk correlating to
a particular factor or group of factors (the existence of those factors in the case
would have to be proven by other evidence). 50 If the court permits an expert to
so testify however, the details of the DA will also be admissible, in the
discretion of the court, for the nonhearsay purpose of showing the basis for the
expert's opinion. 5 '

United States v. Aluminum Co., 35 F. Supp. 820, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (citations omitted).
See also United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971):
The rationale for this [expert testimony] exception to the rule against hearsay is
that the expert, because of his professional knowledge and ability, is competent
to judge for himself the reliability of the records and statements on which he
bases his expert opinion. Moreover, the opinion of expert witnesses must
invariably rest, at least in part, upon sources that can never be proven in court.
An expert's opinion is derived not only from records and data, but from
education and from a lifetime of experience. Thus, when the expert witness has
consulted numerous sources, and uses that information, together with his own
professional knowledge and experience, to arrive at his opinion, that opinion is
regarded as evidence in its own right and not as hearsay in disguise.
Whether particular information meets the required standard of reliability is to be determined
by the court as a preliminary question of fact under Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a). See,
e.g., United States v. Bamman, 737 F.2d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 1984) (no error in excluding
testimony of prison psychologist whose opinion was "speculative and second-hand"). Courts
must make a "finding as to what data experts in the field find reliable" and may not
substitute their "judgment for that of the experts." Indian Coffee Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 752 F.2d 891, 894-95 (3d Cir. 1985). If the court in its discretion, e.g., Horton v. W. T.
Grant Co., 537 F.2d 1215, 1218 (4th Cir. 1976), finds that a sufficient showing of reliability
has been made and admits the expert testimony, the fact finder in evaluating the expert
opinion will again consider the reliability of its basis. See e.g., United States v. Arias, 678
F.2d 1202, 1206 (4th Cir. 1982) (DEA expert's reliance on drug sample sent by another
DEA agent was "a factor to be considered by the jury in assessing the weight of his
testimony...").

150. E.g., United States v. Libby, 475 F. Supp. 2d 73, 85-88 (D.D.C. 2007) (declining
to admit evidence offered by defendant in support of his state of mind defense, absent his
testimony, without which the proffered evidence was irrelevant); Bryant v. State, 900 A.2d
227, 239-40 (Md. 2006) (no abuse of discretion in excluding, as unhelpful and confusing to
jury, defense expert's psychological profile of defendant, which included evidence of
defendant's impulse control disorder, as this evidence was not relevant where defense was
one of mistaken identity, and there was insufficient evidence on the record to support the
witness's testimony); People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 731-33 (N.Y. 2005) (reversible
error to admit testimonial statements of people interviewed by state's psychiatric witness as
basis for her opinion that defendant was not insane); Hartless v. State, 611 A.2d 581, 589-92
(Md. 1992).
151. In a jury trial, however, the judge may so rule only if he or she has determined
those details to be sufficiently helpful to the jury in evaluating the expert's opinion so as to
substantially outweigh the risk of any unfair prejudice from their admission. Federal Rules of
Evidence 703 provides in part: "Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines
that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect."
For examples of bases found sufficiently reliable see Mannino v. Int'l Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d
846, 852-53 (6th Cir. 1981) (studies and literature); Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d
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In order for the expert opinion to be admissible, it must meet three general
152
requirements. First, the subject must be appropriate for expert testimony. 53
Second, the witness must be qualified as an expert in that subject matter.
factual basis for the expert testimony in the particular case
Third, a sufficient
54
must be laid.

There are two subparts to the first requirement. Initially, the opinion must
be helpful to the trier of fact. 155 Second, if based on a scientific principle, the
underlying principle must be either: (a) recognized by statute 56 or (b) be shown
to have met the particular jurisdiction's criteria for scientific evidence. In

550, 552-53 (7th Cir. 1980) (statistics from questionnaire sent out relating to case); Higgins
v. Kinnebrew Motors, Inc., 547 F.2d 1223, 1225-26 (5th Cir. 1977) (statistics from United
States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics); Plant v. Simmons Co., 321 F. Supp.
735, 737-39 (D. Md. 1970) (data from United States Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal
Reserve Board; technical paper by officials of population and systems divisions of Bureau of
Census, published by Department of Commerce; and Economic Report of the President). See
also Milton Co. v. Council of Unit Owners of Bentley Place Condo., 729 A.2d 981, 987-88
(Md. 1999) (no abuse of discretion to admit, for this purpose, surveys interpreted by experts,
so that jury could evaluate conflicting experts' testimony).
With regard to Federal Rules of Evidence 703's effect on a criminal defendant's right of
confrontation see, e.g., United States v. Abbas, 74 F.3d 506, 512-13 (4th Cir. 1996) (no
violation of defendant's right of confrontation); United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 30103 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he introduction of expert testimony based in large part on hearsay
may raise serious constitutional problems if there is no adequate opportunity to crossexamine the witness"; under facts of case, no violation of confrontation right); United States
v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292, 298-99 (3d Cir. 1978) (no violation); United States v. Williams,
447 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (5th Cir. 1971) (no violation of confrontation right in testifying
expert's reliance on records that were not introduced). Cf United States ex rel. Del Vecchio
v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 795 F. Supp. 1406, 1422-23 (N.D. 111.1992) (no violation of
defendant's confrontation right to admit, at sentencing hearing, experts' testimony as to
opinions of non-testifying experts regarding defendant's sanity; defendant had an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine the testifying witnesses about, and offered no reason to doubt
their testimony as to the reliability of the reports of the non-testifying experts).
152. FED. R. EvID. 702. Rule 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if(l) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. The trial court need not apply the Frye-Reed test to statutorily approved tests. See,
e.g., Armstead v. State, 673 A.2d 221, 232 (Md. 1996) (DNA evidence is recognized by
statute). The only way to contest the validity of the underlying principles involved would be
to argue that the statutes violate one's constitutional right to due process of the law. See, e.g.,
State v. Tanner, 457 So. 2d 1172, 1176 (La. 1984) (breath test results suppressed because
state failed to prove its regulations were sufficient to ensure accurate results, because they
did not require testing the "known alcohol standard" for purity). The DA is recognized, for
some purposes, by statute in several jurisdictions. See supra Part IV.C.
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federal court, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. supplies the
standard;1 57 in a number of states, 5 8 the Frye "general acceptance" standard
applies. 5 9 Under Daubert, having achieved "general acceptance"
is not an
60
absolute prerequisite, but merely one of several considerations.
i. Daubert
Under the Daubert standard, the judge assesses reliability by looking at
those of the following factors that are relevant to a particular question:
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory
or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be
whether it can be (and has been) tested....
Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication. Publication (which is but
one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility....
Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court
ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error....
Finally, "general acceptance" can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A
"reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit
identification of a relevant scientific community and an express
determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that
community." Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling
particular evidence admissible, and "a known technique that has been able
to attract only minimal support within the community," may properly be
viewed with skepticism.161
How would the DA fare under a Daubert analysis by a trial judge charged
with excluding unreliable evidence? This question will turn on the judge's
evaluation of the credibility of any testifying experts and of the social science
literature presented to the court. The literature seems to support the conclusion
that the DA can meet the Daubert standard.
The DA and other similar IPV risk assessments are merely a type of
actuarial tool, one that relies on statistical and scientific methods to predict

157. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
158. E.g., People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal. 1994); Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So.

2d 543, 544 (Fla. 2007); Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978); State v. Copeland,
922 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wash. 1996).
159. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
160. 509 U.S. at 597.
161. Id. at 591-95 (citations omitted).
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future violence. 162 Judges make predictions of violence in many settings,
including bail hearings, sentencing proceedings, and hearings on whether to
grant protective orders. 163 Since at least the 1920's, some United States courts
have also used actuarial approaches to inform parole release decisions.Ir4
Due to the chronic nature of intimate partner abuse and high rates of
recidivism, IPV risk prediction lends itself to actuarial analysis. 165 Predictive
accuracy is high because IPV is typically a series of crimes repeatedly
involving the same perpetrator and the same victim.166 Research suggests that
re-abuse between the same two people occurs between twenty-five and fifty
percent of the time. 167 A New York study 1found
the re-arrest rate for domestic
68
violence offenders to be sixty-two percent.
IPV risk assessment tools are derived from a combination of theoretical
principles and scientifically established risk factors. 16 9 The instruments
correlate certain identified risk factors to potentially violent outcomes such as
re-abuse or death. 170 These risk factors "consistently co-occur with

162. See generally Kirk Heilbrun, Prediction Versus Management Models Relevant to
Risk Assessment: The Importance of Legal Decision-Making Context, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 347 (1997); Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Screening for Risk of Inpatient
Violence: Validationof an Actuarial Tool, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 579 (1994).
163. See Steven R. Schlesinger, Bail Reform: Protecting the Community and the
Accused, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 173, 198 (1986) ("judges already make predictions of
future behavior when they set money bail, impose sentences, and approve parole.").
164. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner's Dilemma: Consequences of
Failingto Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings,93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 507-08 (2008) (explaining

the current use by some states of actuarial tables in calculating the eligibility for release);
Adam L. Pollock, Comment, Using Parole to Constitutionally Reconcile the Criminal
Punishment Goals of Desert and Incapacitation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 137 (2006)
(explaining the use of guideline-based (actuarial) parole release). This use may be most
easily recognized regarding the punishment of "sexual predators." See, e.g., Andrew J.
Harris, Risk Assessment and Sex Offender Community Supervision: A Context-Specific
Framework, 70 FED. PROBATION 36 (2006) (discussing developments in the use of actuarial
approaches to risk assessment tools used in civil commitment laws against sexual offenders);
Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275 (2006)
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of actuarial prediction, and how the rules of
evidence should be interpreted in allowing expert testimony, based on these actuarial
predictions, in sentencing sexual predators).
165. See Campbell, et al., Femicide, supra note 9,at 1089 (explaining that because of
the high rates of prior abuse by partners, the best way to prevent future femicide is to
identify battered women at risk before it is too late).
166. Id. at 1091.
167. Donald G. Dutton & P. Randall Kropp, A Review of Domestic Violence Risk
Instruments, 1 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 171, 172 (2000).
168. NORA K. PUFFETT & CHANDRA GAVIN, PREDICTORS OF OUTCOME AND RECIDIVISM
AT THE BRONX MISDEMEANOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT 2 (2004).

169. Arlene N. Weisz, Richard M. Tolman & Daniel G. Saunders, Assessing the Risk
of Severe Domestic Violence: The Importance of Survivors' Predictions, 15 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 75, 75-79 (2000); Dutton & Kropp, supra note 167, at 172-73.
170. Dutton & Kropp, supra note 167, at 174-76.
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abusiveness.' 71 The high likelihood of IPV recidivism 172 reduces the
possibility of an IPV risk instrument falsely identifying a non-repeat abuser as a
high-risk repeat abuser.
1.

Validation of Risk Factors

The DA was first designed by a health professional to help abused women
understand their risk of being murdered by their partners. 17' In 2003, the fifteen74
risk factors were empirically confirmed in an eleven-city case control study. 1
Investigators at each site collaborated with local law
enforcement personnel,
75
medical examiners, and domestic violence agencies.
IPV homicide cases were identified by extracting homicide data from
medical examiner records from 1994 to 2000.176 Information was obtained
about lethal cases by interviewing "proxy informants," friends and family of
the decedents. 77 Researchers identified two potential proxy informants from
the police or medical examiner records who might be familiar with the victim
and her relationship with the perpetrator. 78 Proxies were contacted by mail,
and if no response was received they were contacted again by phone or in
person. 79 Victims of attempted femicide s° and controls 181 (other women who
had been physically abused by their intimate partners, but were not victims of
attempted murder) were personally interviewed.
In addition to the use of proven psychometric variables for violence, the
82
DA incorporates the victim's perception of violence as a factor for re-abuse.
Although not as predictive as the other DA factors, research has indicated that
combining the woman's perception of violence with the other DA factors
greatly increases the accuracy of risk prediction.'83

171. Id. at 173.
172. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
173. See generally Campbell, et al., The DangerAssessment, supra note 20; Campbell,
Nursing Assessment, supra note 20.
174. Campbell, et al., Femicide, supra note 9, at 1089.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1093.
181. Id. at 1090.
182. Id. at 1092; Dutton & Kropp, supra note 167, at 174-75; see Weisz, et al., supra
note 169, at 76, 86 (discussing how the focus in domestic violence has shifted to the victim's
ability to predict violence).
183. See Weisz, et al., supra note 169, at 86.
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PeerReview

The DA has been the subject of over thirty peer reviews 184 and has been
praised for using published empirical evaluation of psychometric properties
such as test-retest and internal consistency reliability.185 In a second validation
study, independent researchers evaluated three popular risk assessment
instruments: the K-SID, SARA, and DA. 186 Of the three, only the DA was
designed to predict risk of homicide.' 87 Yet, of the three, the DA was also the
most consistent in predicting repeat non-homicidal re-assault. 88
3.

Known or PotentialErrorRate

A third validation study, the Risk Assessment Validation Experiment
(RAVE), evaluated the DA and other risk assessment instruments.' 89 In the
RAVE, a sample of 1,307 battered women from shelters, family courts,
hospitals, and community programs were given a risk assessment at baseline. 9 0
Sixty percent were re-interviewed in 9 months; 31 percent of the women who
were re-interviewed had been re-assaulted.' 9' The DA's predictive validity was
again confirmed; results of the study92 showed that the DA was predictive of
both re-assault and severe re-assault.1
Research has confirmed that the DA, like other risk assessment tools, is
helpful both in informing a victim about her potential risk and in helping
professionals identify and understand potential risk. 193 When scientifically
evaluated for accuracy in predicting fatal or near fatal outcomes, the DA was
found to be a significantly reliable predictor of female homicide and near
homicide, but not a perfect predictor. 194 One study concluded that the DA is

184. See John Hopkins Univ. Sch. of Nursing, Danger Assessment Reference List

(2005), http://www.dangerassessment.org/WebApplicationl/pages/references.aspx

(listing

DA references).
185. JAN ROEHL

& KRISTIN GUERTIN, CURRENT USE OF DANGEROUSNESS ASSESSMENTS
IN SENTENCING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS 11 (1998).
186. D. ALEX HECKERT & EDWARD W. GONDOLF, PREDICTING LEVELS OF ABUSE AND
(2004),
AMONG
BATTERER
PROGRAM
PARTICIPANTS
14
REASSAULT
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/202997.pdf.
187. Id. at48.
188. Id.
189. JANICE ROEHL, CHRIS O'SULLIVAN, DANIEL

WEBSTER & JACQUELYN CAMPBELL,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT VALIDATION STUDY: THE RAVE STUDY
PRACTITIONER SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS: VALIDATION OF TOOLS FOR ASSESSING
INTIMATE
PARTNERS
(2005),
RISK
FROM
VIOLENT

http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 1/nij/grants/209732.pdf.

190. Id. at 3.
191. Id. at3, 14.
192. Id. at 12 tbl.10.
193. ROEHL, ET AL., VALIDATION
194. Id. at 21.

STUDY,

supra note 24, at 16.
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quite reliable in correctly identifying extreme-risk victims (high sensitivity).,95
If the DA has a weakness, it is in producing false positives, meaning it tends to
over-predict extreme risk of lethal outcomes. 196 This suggests that possible
further calibration may enhance specificity. Until that time, however, providing
appropriate protective measures for all identified as at extreme risk would be
judicious. Because the DA is valid, has been subjected to peer review, and has
a known and low rate of error, there is good reason to believe that it passes the
Daubert test.
ii.

Frye Jurisdictions

In Daubert jurisdictions, courts apply the Daubert test both to scientific
evidence and to non-scientific expert testimony.1 97 By contrast, Frye
jurisdictions generally apply the Frye test only to novel scientific techniques in
the "hard" sciences.' 98 Certainly the underlying actuarial, mathematical
principles applied in the social science research underlying the DA pass the
Frye test. Whether social science conclusions must also pass the test, when they
are based on those actuarial principles, is a significant threshold question.'"
The authors believe that Frye is inapplicable to those conclusions, which are
not matters of "hard" science. °0 If Frye does not apply to the DA, the test for

195. Id. Validity has two components: sensitivity and specificity. Sensitivity refers to
the instrument's ability to accurately identify women who are at high risk. See generally id.
196. Id. Specificity refers to the instrument's ability to correctly identify those women
who are not at high risk. See generally Campbell, et al., Assessing Risk Factors,supra note
10.
197. See e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141(1999).
198. The Maryland Court of Appeals, for example, has held that the Frye test does not
apply to "medical opinion evidence," such as expert testimony that a person suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder, as the opinion was not "presented as a scientific test the
results of which were controlled by inexorable physical laws." State v. Allewalt, 517 A.2d
741, 745 (Md. 1986). Nor, clearly, is the DA presented as being "controlled by inexorable
physical laws."
199. See supra note 198. On the other hand, the Maryland Court of Appeals has held
that a physician's opinion that a person's sickness was caused by mold should not have been
admitted without a Frye hearing "to determine whether the medical community generally
accepts the theory that mold exposure causes the illnesses that respondents claimed to have
suffered, and the propriety of the tests [the witness] employed to reach his medical
conclusions." Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chesson, 923 A.2d 939, 947 (Md. 2007). See
also Raeder, The Better Way, supra note 11, at 165 ("Like Daubert, Frye is also a difficult
standard to apply to psychological testimony").
200. If Frye is held to apply, however, the DA can meet it if the DA is shown to be
"generally accepted" by the pertinent scientific community. See supra note 159 and
accompanying text. At least one court has so held. In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d
1184, 1192 (111.2004) (actuarial risk assessments meet Frye test, as they are generally
accepted by mental health experts, and were properly admitted in bench trial on issue of risk

of recidivism).
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admissibility would be relevance weighed against the risks of unfair prejudice,
confusion or distraction of the jury, or undue consumption of trial time.20 '
C.

Risk of UnfairPrejudice

When evidence passes muster under the more specific evidence rules,
there remains one more hurdle: the judge has discretion under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 or its state corollaries to exclude the evidence if its probative
value is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,2 2
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,20 3 or by considerations of undue
delay,2° waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 20 5
Opponents of DA evidence surely will argue that it should be excluded on each
of these grounds in jury trials: the contentions will be that the jury will give it
too much weight; the jury will overlook the fact that the DA is based on the
victim's truthfulness and that it must decide whether the victim was telling the
truth; the jury will misapprehend the probability aspect of the DA and believe it
to be an infallible predictor. Opponents will argue that hearing expert testimony
thus will add little of value and much confusion, so that admitting DA evidence
is not worth the considerable time it will take to perform direct and crossexaminations of either an expert - or worse, of competing experts.
These arguments should generally succeed in a criminal trial on the merits
when DA evidence is offered against an accused, and should generally fail
when the evidence is offered by an accused. Because of the relaxed rules in
proceedings like bail hearings and sentencing proceedings, however, DA

201. See United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) ("Unless an
exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its use
prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in
the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by crossexamination and refutation."). Judge Butzner, writing for the court of appeals, recognized the
dangers of admitting unreliable scientific evidence:
There are good reasons why not every ostensibly scientific technique should be
recognized as the basis for expert testimony. Because of its apparent objectivity,
an opinion that claims a scientific basis is apt to carry undue weight with the trier
of fact. In addition, it is difficult to rebut such an opinion except by other experts
or by cross-examination based on a thorough acquaintance with the underlying
principles. In order to prevent deception or mistake and to allow the possibility
of effective response, there must be a demonstrable, objective procedure for
reaching the opinion and qualified persons who can either duplicate the result or
criticize the means by which it was reached, drawing their own conclusions from
the underlying facts.
Id. But he also pointed out that "[a]bsolute certainty of result or unanimity of scientific
opinion is not required for admissibility. 'Every useful new development must have its first
day in court."' Id. (citation omitted).
202. E.g., Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 172 (1997).
203. E.g., United States v. LaRouche, 896 F.2d 815, 826-27 (4th Cir. 1990); Eng v.
Scully, 146 F.R.D. 74, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

204. E.g., United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 744-45 (4th Cir. 1996).
205. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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evidence should survive a Rule 403 argument even when offered against a
defendant in those settings. Conditions of release, such as relinquishing a
firearm, may be valuably informed by the DA 20 6 and, as a result, innocent lives
may be saved.
The authors of this article believe that the DA evidence also should be
leniently admitted in civil proceedings, particularly on motions for protective
orders and in family law matters regarding divorce, 0 7 child custody and
visitation. 20 ' The judge should have the benefit of current social science
regarding factors correlated with greater risk of re-assault and of lethal or nearlethal injury.
D.

Recommended Future Steps

Increased efforts should be made to provide judicial training regarding the
DA, so that the judge's knowledge is not limited to what the parties provide. To
ensure admissibility in certain proceedings, such as bail, sentencing, protective
orders, and family law proceedings, particular jurisdictions should choose to
take legislative action so providing. The statutes should be flexible enough to
embrace future iterations as informed by continuing empirical research. Absent
such a statute, the drafters of the DA may well be advised to amend the form so
that it will better comport with a particular jurisdiction's existing hearsay
exceptions. 209 If the applicable rules and statutes do not permit requiring the
forfeiture of guns at crucial times such as the entry of restraining orders or
setting of bail conditions, the jurisdiction ought to take steps to make that
precaution possible. 1 0

206. See Campbell, et al., Assessing Risk Factors, supra note 10 (regarding protection

orders in states that include firearm search and seizure provisions). See supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text.
207. Domestic violence is relevant to proving grounds for absolute or limited divorce,
such as excessively vicious conduct, cruelty of treatment, or constructive desertion. It also
may be relevant to alimony and division of marital property, as pertinent to the
"circumstances that contributed to the estrangement" of the parties. E.g., MD. CODE ANN.
FAM. LAW. § 8-205(b) (LexisNexis 2006).
208. Domestic violence may need to be proven to contest a batterer's request for joint
or sole custody or to have restrictions placed on the batterer's visitation. See Rona Marech,
Experts Question Family Legal System; Children's Death Raise Issue of Adequate
Protection in Custody Disputes, THE BALT. SuN, Apr. 1, 2008, at 4A ("'I think people do not

realize how much connection there is between domestic violence and child abuse,' said
Dorothy Lennig, the director of the domestic violence legal clinic at the House of Ruth.").
209. In Maryland, for example, providing for the victim to sign her statements will
make them admissible as substantive evidence at trial if she testifies inconsistently with
them. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. It should be noted that doing so may also
make the statements discoverable by the other party in litigation. Similarly, introduction of
her statements at trial will waive any otherwise applicable privilege, such as lawyer-client, if
her statements were made to her attorney.
210. See supra notes 2, 45, 206, and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The Danger Assessment questionnaire posed to victims of intimate partner
violence has great potential for more widespread use in court. Use of the DA in
the criminal justice system in screening cases will increase the likelihood that
the most dangerous offenders will be most aggressively prosecuted; use in bail
review, sentencing, and probation decisions will increase the likelihood that the
victims at highest risk will receive appropriate protective measures. Use in the
civil arena of family law should decrease the chance that courts underestimate
the degree of risk to mothers and children, and help to avert future tragedies of
femicide, infanticide, and the abuser's subsequent suicide. Many of these uses
should be permitted under existing rules already available to courts, though
particular jurisdictions may well choose to ensure admissibility by enacting
statutes specifically addressing risk assessment evidence.

